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Abstract 
 
The economic performances of the Eurozone look weaker than those of the United States over 
the period 1999-2006, in spite of the fact that the former applies more thoroughly the 'new 
macroeconomics' governance rules concerning public deficits and inflation control. The 
literature emphasizes Alan Greenspan's pragmatism when discussing the relative success of 
the Fed, but the reasons why pragmatism ought to do better than a thorough application of the 
'new macroeconomics' theoretical recommendations remain unexplored. The paper focuses on 
the advantage of monetary policy pragmatism in the face of Keynesian uncertainty. More 
specifically, it points out the trials of the 'new macroeconomics' principles of monetary policy 
when they are implemented in a Keynesian context, that is, within a system which does not 
have any 'natural' anchor. 
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Introduction 
 
The paper focuses on the effectiveness of the Fed and ECB monetary policies over the period 
1999-2006. As Fontana (2006) put forward, the Fed's 'dual mandate' allows for more flexible 
monetary policy than the single mandate of the ECB. That is an important topic of the 
characterization of both monetary policies over the short run. But the 'dual mandate' vanishes 
when the long run monetary policy objectives are considered, at least in the official discourse. 
In the long run, the official primary objective of both central banks merely amounts to ensure 
price stability, as recommended by the 'New Consensus' principles of governance (see 
Rochon, 2006). In practice, however, the policies show some distance from the theory, 
especially in the case of the Fed (Galbraith, 2006). 
 Yet, while the European Union follows more accurately the new-economics 
recommendations on prices and public deficits control, the Fed's policy seems to be more 
effective. Various authors have put forward the Greenspan’s pragmatism or the ECB’s 
dogmatism as the main cause of the Fed's relative success1, but the reasons why pragmatism 
ought to do better than a thorough application of the mainstream theoretical recommendations 
remain unexplored. The paper explores those reasons by considering the advantage of 
pragmatism in the face of Keynesian uncertainty. The argument is basically that the 'New 
Consensus' macroeconomic policies entail pernicious effects when they are implemented in a 
system which doesn't tend spontaneously toward any 'natural' position. 
 We put forward three arguments. a) According to the 'New Consensus', monetary policy 
may be helpful in stabilizing the economy around the assumed 'natural' trajectory in case of 
nominal rigidities. But in a system without natural anchoring, as the one Keynes considered in 
his General Theory, if the central bank takes the current rate of unemployment as a 'natural' 
one, it tends to anchor the economy away from full employment. b) Distributive tensions (like 
wages, mark-up or fiscal pressures) feed the demand for money and push monetary authorities 
to arbitrate between providing more money so as to preserve the economic activity (which 
feeds the cost push spiral) or raising the rate of interest so as to repress inflationary pressures. 
While reducing monetary inflation has no permanent cost in terms of unemployment in the 
mainstream theory for the supply side is the driving force in the long run, it does in a 
Keynesian world where the effective demand is the driving force the short and in the long run. 
c) As macroeconomic policy involves both monetary and fiscal authorities, independent 
decisions may produce coordination failures. It happens that unconditional low inflation 
targeting is likely to produce adverse policy interactions in the Eurozone. For example, a rise 
 
in the rate of interest aiming at countering the average inflationary effects of the fiscal 
impulse implemented in any country weakens the effective demand for all the member 
countries. 
 The paper contains two sections. The first one starts by comparing the 'official' monetary 
policies of both regions. Then, the 'New Consensus' precepts are emphasized and compared 
with the implemented policies. Section 2 discusses the advantage of pragmatism in the face of 
Keynesian uncertainty. 
 
1. Similar discourses, different practices 
 
This section shows that, in accordance with the 'New Consensus' macroeconomics which 
clearly inspires the official discourses, the Fed and ECB mission in the long run amounts to 
stabilize the price index (1.1). But in practice, the ECB applies the low inflation targeting 
policy more thoroughly (1.2). 
 
1.1. Similar discourses 
 
The official documentation of the ECB refers quite transparently to the essential features of 
the 'New Consensus' (namely, money neutrality and supply side leading role2), and therefore 
denies any influence of the monetary policy on output and employment in the long run: 
 
"(…) in the long run, real income is essentially determined by supply-side factors (e.g. 
technology, population growth, the flexibility of markets and the efficiency of the 
institutional framework of the economy). It is therefore the task of fiscal and structural 
policies – but also of those involved in the wage-bargaining process – to enhance the 
growth potential of the economy." ECB (2006) The European Central Bank - 
History…, p 47.  
 
"(...) the theoretical foundations of monetary policy as well as experience drawn from 
the past demonstrate that monetary policy can ultimately only influence the price level 
in the economy (…)." ECB (2006) The European Central Bank - History…, p 45 
 
"Thus, price stability is the only feasible objective for the single monetary policy over 
the medium term" ECB (2006) The European Central Bank - History…, p 45 
 

Actually, the ECB and the Fed discourses about the benefits of price stability in the long run3 
are perfectly similar (though, in The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and functions, the Fed 
does not explicitly mention the neutrality of money in the long run): 
 
"Price stability makes it easier for people to recognize changes in relative prices since 
such changes are not obscured by fluctuations in the overall price level. This enables 
firms and consumers to make better-informed decisions on consumption and 
investment. This in turn allows the market to allocate resources more efficiently. By 
helping the market to guide resources to where they can be used most productively, 
price stability raises the productive potential of the economy". The European Central 
Bank –History…, 2006, p 46.4 
 
"When prices are stable and believed likely to remain so, the prices of goods, services, 
materials, and labor are undistorted by inflation and serve as clearer signals and guides 
to the efficient allocation of resources and thus contribute to higher standards of living. 
Moreover, stable prices foster saving and capital formation, because when the risk of 
erosion of asset values resulting from inflation—and the need to guard against such 
losses—are minimized, households are encouraged to save more and businesses are 
encouraged to invest more. (…) price stability can help achieve maximum sustainable 
output growth and employment over the longer run,…". FRS, 2005, p 15 
 
Thus, over the long run, the objective of both institutions amounts merely to price stability: 
 
"Stable prices in the long run are a precondition for maximum sustainable output 
growth and employment as well as moderate long-term interest rates." FRS, 2005, p 15 
 
Indeed, as shown above, the best contribution which the ECB can make to promoting, 
among other things, “sustainable and noninflationary growth” and a “high level of 
employment”, as referred to in Article 2 of the EC Treaty, is to pursue a monetary 
policy aimed at price stability.The European Central Bank -–History…, 2006, p 47 
 
In the short run however, exogenous shocks may induce the central bank to concede some 
deviation from the long run objective.  On this subject also the Fed and the ECB do agree: 
 
 
"For a wide variety of shocks (e.g. demand shocks, which move output and prices in 
the same direction) a prompt reaction by monetary policy is often adequate and will 
not only preserve price stability but also help to stabilize the economy. However, there 
are other types of economic shock (e.g. of a cost-push nature, like oil price hikes) that 
move output and prices in opposite directions. An excessively aggressive policy 
response to restore price stability in a very short span of time may, in these 
circumstances, risk imparting a significant cost in terms of output and employment 
volatility which, over a longer horizon, could also affect price developments. In these 
cases, it is widely recognized that a gradual response of monetary policy is appropriate 
both to avoid unnecessarily high volatility in real activity and to maintain price 
stability over a longer horizon. " The monetary policy of the ECB (ECB 2004, p 54). 
 
"Although price stability can help achieve maximum sustainable output growth and 
employment over the longer run, in the short run some tension can exist between the 
two goals. Often, a slowing of employment is accompanied by lessened pressures on 
prices, and moving to counter the weakening of the labor market by easing policy does 
not have adverse inflationary effects. Sometimes, however, upward pressures on prices 
are developing as output and employment are softening—especially when an adverse 
supply shock, such as a spike in energy prices, has occurred. Then, an attempt to 
restrain inflation pressures would compound the weakness in the economy, or an 
attempt to reverse employment losses would aggravate inflation. In such 
circumstances, those responsible for monetary policy face a dilemma and must decide 
whether to focus on defusing price pressures or on cushioning the loss of employment 
and output." FRS, 2005, p 15  

Clearly, both central banks aim at counter short run price deviation related to temporary 
demand shocks (which supposes active support to activity), but in case of supply shocks, they 
will arbitrate between reducing inflationary pressures and smoothing their impact on 
employment and activity. Hence, according to the official discourses, the Fed and ECB 
monetary policies could only differ in the way they manage supply shocks in the short run. 
Over the long run, they should not differ or have real effects. The experience of the ECB 
maybe is too short to allow drawing robust conclusions, but empirical comparison with the 
Fed's policy nevertheless provide interesting information on the subject. 
 
 
1.2. Monetary policies in practice 
 
The period considered starts with a sharp increase in oil prices and a tightening of monetary 
policies that will be ephemeral in both regions because of the change of the international 
macroeconomic context. In the United States, the burst of the speculative bubble at the end of 
2000 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001 weaken the economic growth; in Europe, the 
end of the fiscal adjustments strengthens the economic recovery started in 1998. Yet, the 
activity bounces rapidly in the United States, strengthened by the rapid decrease in the Fed 
interest rates and the prompt budgetary response, while it runs out of steam in the Eurozone 
from spring 2000, in spite of the decreasing rates of the ECB (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Fed. and ECB main interest rates (%), 1999-2006 
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 The moderate increase of the Federal funds rate in 1999-2000 brings them to 6,5% at the 
end of 2000. The interest rate then decreases quickly during the first five months of 2001 (50 
basis points by month) before the slowdown of the summer when they reach 3,5%. The 
terrorist attacks trigger a second wave of decreases: from 3,5% in the early September, the 
federal funds rate pass to 3% on September 17, 2,5 in October, 2 in November, and 1,75% in 
December, staying at this level about one year). Clearly, the oil prices inflationary pressures 
are relegated in the background because of the deflation threat, with the result that the 
monetary policy supports aggregate demand strongly. 
 	
 In the same time, the recession in Europe prompts the ECB to relax its policy, but the 
response is much weaker. Considering that monetary policy does not influence real 
magnitudes over the long run, the ECB gives priority to the stabilization of inflation 
expectations5. This analysis corroborates the results of Creel and Fayolle (2002) concerning 
the responses that would have been those of the ECB if it had applied the Fed's 'Taylor rule' 
estimated by Mankiw (2001) over the nineties. 
 
"Si on applique brutalement cette formule aux données de la zone euro, on trouve deux 
résultats : le taux de refinancement pratiqué par la Bce depuis 1999 aurait du être en 
permanence franchement plus bas qu’il ne l’a été, et même négatif, mais il aurait dû 
aussi connaître depuis début 1999 une remontée nettement plus prononcée que celle 
qu’il a connu..." Creel et Fayolle (2002), p 195.6 
 
 Here can be seen the consequences of declaring an inflation target: by committing to 
maintain the inflation rate near to 2% over the medium term, the ECB indeed leaves itself 
some room for manœuvre in the short run7, some discretionary power, all the more as the 
'short' and 'medium run' notions are not precisely defined. But, on the one hand, that power is 
more limited than the Fed's one, for the Fed does not specify any quantitative target8, and on 
the other hand, it makes it dangerous to support frankly the economic activity in the face of 
important shocks, since the inflation gap which would result could be considered an 
infringement of the declared target, and therefore could harm the ECB's credibility and feed 
inflation expectations9. 
 Finally, the sort of 'constrained discretion' implemented by the ECB seems to be more 
effective to stabilize prices (see figure 2), but the data suggest that there is a substantial cost in 
terms of economic activity (see figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Figure 2 Consumer prices indices 
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Figure 3 Gross domestic product, volume, market prices 
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2. The pernicious effects of dogmatism in monetary policy 
 
It is paradoxical to believe in money neutrality and to be so anxious about inflation. To 
believe in money neutrality and to affirm at the same time, as both central banks do, that 
inflation is prejudicial to resources allocation. The central banks purpose is actually that 
money is neutral provided there is no inflation, because inflation does interfere with the real 
prices adjustment and resources allocation, which amounts to say, tautologically, that money 
is neutral provided money is neutral. Either money is neutral and inflation does not really 
 
matter, or it is not, and then inflation and monetary policy must be investigated within an 
appropriate theoretical framework.  
 The Walrasian approach to general equilibrium, in the form proposed by Arrow and 
Debreu in 1954, rests upon a theoretical market system which allows for spot and future 
contracts. The hypothesis of a complete set of markets ensures that spot and all futures prices 
are initially determined by the supply-demand matching conditions. Therefore, the system is 
not really dynamic, since the future is reduced to the accomplishment of the transactions 
initially decided. 
 In this framework, where any competitive equilibrium is shown to be Pareto optimal as 
concerns resources allocation, integrating money and inflation raises important difficulties, 
for it would require that spot markets will open in the future so as to take account of possible 
changes in prices, and that would contradict the view that transactions are predetermined for 
all dates in the future (which is required for the intertemporal Pareto optimal equilibrium 
being determined). Hence, in this conceptual intertemporal framework, inflation and monetary 
policy can not be integrated but in the neutral way. That supposes to reduce uncertainty to 
risk, in order for the future prices to be initially foreseeable within a stochastic 'white noise' 
around the assumed 'natural' trajectory. Actually, from the theoretical point of view, it is well 
known that optimality is not a general property of competitive markets since the stability of 
the walrasian competitive equilibrium is questionable, even in the absence of uncertainty; 
stability requires specific conditions (namely gross substitution of aggregate demand 
functions). But the 'Sonnenshein-Mantel-Debreu' theorem stated that nothing ensures such 
conditions within the Walras-Arrow-Debreu framework. Thus, efficiency of competitive 
markets unfortunately simply is a postulate that reflects the beliefs of those who refer to it, it 
is not a scientifically established result. Finally, it is because they deny uncertainty and 
believe to competitive market optimality that central banks claim that prices stability is a 
precondition of efficiency. 
The view on the effectiveness of uncertainty and on the efficiency of markets is crucial in 
monetary policy theory, for the adequate policy closely depends on the long run properties of 
the economic system. For example, in the mainstream's ergodic representation of the world, 
the economic system is assumed to possess strong regulatory forces which, in the long run, 
anchor the economy on a predetermined trajectory and make rational expectations reliable. 
Within such a representation, the best monetary policy can do is to stabilize the economy 
around the predetermined or 'natural' trajectory10. On the other hand, there is no 
predetermined trajectory in non-ergodic regimes, with the result that people can not 
  
reasonably have full confidence in their expectations, even rationally conceived. That is the 
starting point of Keynes's liquidity preference theory, and of The General Theory. In these 
regimes, monetary policy takes part in the trajectory of the economic system both in the short 
and in the long run. It is not neutral. 
 This section discusses the effects of uncertainty on the macroeconomic adjustment 
mechanisms and then considers the drawbacks that may result from implementing the 
monetary policy of the 'New Consensus' in a Keynesian system which does not have any 
'natural' anchor or trajectory. 
 
2.1. Uncertainty and macroeconomic adjustment 
 
Keynes, in relation with the widest apprehension of uncertainty, conceived his general theory 
without postulating any 'natural' position or trajectory. That does not mean that people can not 
make rational expectations, but the meaning and usefulness of such forward looking 
information is far weaker than the one usually given to it in mainstream's economics. 
Keynesian rational expectations admit that people make use of all the available information, 
of course, but whatever the kind of probabilistic tools they might make use of, true 
uncertainty makes it not so rational to consider expectations a satisfactory basis for decision 
making. That is the reason why Keynes thought that decisions actually "also depend on the 
confidence with which we make this forecast--on how highly we rate the likelihood of our 
best forecast turning out quite wrong" (Keynes, 1936, ch. 12, s. 2). 
 The liquidity preference concept, which results from that kind of uncertainty, has heavy 
consequences as concerns the macroeconomic adjustment process. If aggregate demand and 
prices decrease, the misleadingly called 'Keynes effect' and the real balance effect do not 
work as an anchor to the full employment, for speculative and precautionary decisions may 
increase the demand for money, thereby inhibiting the interest rate and the real balance 
effects. Furthermore, the money supply may endogenously decrease along with the demand 
for money. As a matter of consequences, the output and employment equilibrium levels 
depend on the level at which the monetary policy and the demand for money will eventually 
put the rate of interest. This is the reason why Keynes thought about his general theory as a 
theory of shifting equilibrium11. Since the nominal wages decrease does not ensure positive 
effects on the effective demand either (General Theory, Ch. 19), there is no endogenous 
correction of unemployment, and, furthermore, Keynesian unemployment has to be thought as 
a situation where both, the real wages and the interest rate, have met a kind of threshold12. 
 
Let us consider a context of Keynesian unemployment where the rate of interest is 
exogenously determined by the monetary authorities (which, however, does not control it 
perfectly, especially if reductions are concerned, because of the demand for money instability; 
see below), and real wages have met an exogenous threshold ( w ) owing to the workers 
resistance as suggested above. The current wage, nonetheless, is allowed to deviate from this 
threshold when certain events occur, such as a change in unemployment rate or exogenous 
disturbances, like in equation 4 of Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Keynesian 'shifting equilibrium' conditions (deviation from previous equilibrium) 
 
 
( ) tagiy ˆˆ γϕλσ −++−=
 
 
 
(1) Effective demand (see appendix n°2) drives 
aggregate supply (y) 
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(2) Suppliers set the price of goods so as to 
equalize the real labour cost to the marginal 
productivity that results from adjusting output to 
effective demand ('1st classical postulate' holds)a. 
This condition provides the mark-up price 
equation (see appendix n°3) 
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(3) Demand: given by the short run production 
function, as a function of the aggregate demand 
(diminishing marginal product: <1) 
 
 
Labour 
market 
( n*, w*) 
 ( )nnww f −−= θ  
(4) Excess of supply ('2d classical postulate' 
rejected), except when effective demand is at the 
full employment level. 
 
Money 
market 
( m*) 
 
ipym ˆη−+=  
 
(5) Market clearing condition given the interest 
rate (endogenous money supply) 
 
Bonds 
market 
 
Implicit 
 
 
Aggregate budget constraint 
 
(a)
 As stated by Davidson (1983), the marginal product equalization to the real labour cost 
does not provide the labour demand function, but the 'real wage - effective demand' 
relationship 
n is the relative variation in employment 
nf is the total labour force 
w is the nominal wage relative variation 
y is the relative variation in volume of output 
c represents exogenous technological factors 
 
g is the relative variation in the government demand for goods 
tˆ  is the tax rate variation (which has both a supply and a demand effect: see appendix n°1) 
a is the relative variation in the exogenous part of aggregate private demand 
iˆ  is the variation in the rate of interest 
m is the relative variation in the quantity of money 
 
Within the usual four macro-markets framework, a general equilibrium supposes a set of 
conditions which expresses compatible aggregate supply and demand plans. Because of the 
generalized budget constraint13, three markets only have to be explicit (the bonds market will 
remain implicit), which supposes two relative prices (the real wage in terms of goods, the rate 
of interest and the real price of money in terms of goods, which inverse is the nominal price of 
goods). Moreover, since the interest rate is assumed to be exogenous for the moment, the 
general equilibrium conditions reduce to five: the goods market supply and demand 
conditions (which compatibility requires the equilibrium values y* and p*), the labour market 
supply and demand conditions (which compatibility requires n* and w*), and the money 
market clearing condition, given the exogenous interest rate (which requires m*). We focus on 
the short run motion of the system, in the sense that the productive physical stock of capital is 
assumed to be constant during the period considered. Hence, variables are expressed in terms 
of relative variations from their initial value, except the rate of interest and the tax rate, which 
are expressed as variations. All parameters are positive. 
Because of the effects of uncertainty on the 'state of confidence', the liquidity preference 
theory can explain unforeseeable shifts in the demand for money (The General Theory, Ch. 
12). This specificity of Keynes's approach will be formally underlined through considering η 
an exogenous variable subject to the volatility of expectations (equation 5)14. It has heavy 
implications on monetary policy because it makes the central bank control of the long term 
interest rate questionable. When the monetary base is increased through lowering the short 
term rate, lower long term bank rates in principle boost the demand for credit, provided the 
liquidity preference does not shift too much. But an increasing liquidity preference may 
conversely make banks able to sell more credit without having to reduce their interest rates, 
for non-bank loans (bonds) rates in this case tend to rise in order to compensate the increasing 
liquidity preference. Therefore, the 'New Consensus' optimal monetary rule, which assumes 
that authorities always can adjust the rate of interest to the assumed 'natural' level, is irrelevant 
in a Keynesian context15. 
 
2.2. Inflation targeting drawbacks in the absence of a 'natural' anchor 
 
According to the 'New Consensus' macroeconomics, monetary and fiscal instruments can be 
activated usefully, in the presence of nominal rigidities, so as to reduce the volatility of 
aggregate demand, output and prices around the assumed 'natural' trajectory, as indicated in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: 'New Consensus' stabilization policies (around the assumed 'natural' trajectory) 
 
 
Monetary policya  
( î, 'Taylor 
rule') 
 
 
np β−=
 
(6) 0, measures the relative weight 
of unemployment deviations compa-
red to price deviations ('flexibility' of 
monetary policy) 
 
Fiscal policya  
( g or tˆ ) 
 
 
nb ψ=
 
 
(7) 0, measures the relative 
weight of unemployment compared 
to budget balance deviations (b) in  
the government preferences 
(a)
 These simple policy rules can be derived by minimization of loss-functions16. 
 
According to these formal policy rules, the central bank implements disinflation measures 
when the level of unemployment decreases, while the government set taxes and/or 
expenditures so as to adjust the budget balance (b, see appendix n°4) in a counter-cyclical 
way. Such governance principles work symbiotically within the ergodic 'New Consensus' 
approach17. They stabilize perfectly the system, without budget balance deviations since the 
governments have two instruments and may therefore stabilize both, the output level and the 
budget balance, while the central bank stabilizes the price index. But the same principles may 
produce severe drawbacks if they are implemented in the non-ergodic system of Table 1. 
Indeed, in the presence of Keynesian unemployment, that is to say, without spontaneous 
return towards the full employment, as long as the actual unemployment and interest rates are 
interpreted as 'natural' rates, they serve as macroeconomic policy targets, with the result that 
the policy mix 'symbiotically' anchors the system away from the full employment (provided 
the central bank has enough influence on the long term interest rate). The situation then may 
persist for it seems to be the consequence of real wages rigidity (p=0, and w= w  provided 
nf=0), which is one of the main causes of natural unemployment in the 'New Consensus' 
Macroeconomics. 
 
This line of argument suggests a kind of unemployment trap, to which the mainstream 
economics uses to refer as hysteresis18: when authorities lack for room for manoeuvre in the 
face of a negative shock, for example because of budget balance considerations, the output 
stabilization only works partially, and unemployment increases. Since nothing tends to reduce 
it then, authorities take the actual unemployment rate as the new 'natural' one. This gives a 
rationale to the idea that the dogmatism of the ECB, along with the Stability and Growth Pact, 
could have weighed on the employment situation of the Eurozone after the economic reversal 
of the early 2000s, therefore explaining the stagnation that followed. 
 Similar drawbacks may arise in case of distributive tensions. According to Table 1, the 
mark-up price equation (2) shows inflation factors that depend on income distribution 
concerns (mark-up, fiscal tax rate, wages pressure relative to productivity gains19). These 
factors influence indirectly the unemployment rate through the monetary policy reaction they 
may trigger. Whatever the causes of inflationary pressures are, the central bank always can 
restrict the effective inflation by increasing the interest rate and the level of unemployment in 
such a way that the pressures fade (the control of the long run interest rate is hardly 
questionable when increases are considered). Actually, inflation always is a monetary 
phenomenon since it expresses higher monetary prices of goods and services, but while the 
mainstream's economics incriminates irresponsible or lax policies, the Keynesian approach 
points out the dilemma involved by the distributive tensions: to preserve the value of money 
and assume higher unemployment, or to preserve employment and let inflation develop. The 
former states moreover that reducing monetary inflation has no permanent cost in terms of 
unemployment, whereas it does for the latter, as far as persistent tensions induce monetary 
authorities to 'incomes policy of fear'  (Davidson, 2006)20. 
 As concerns income distribution, beyond the pragmatism of the Fed, the USA has had the 
advantage of knowing more favourable economic conditions than he ECB. Although the 
globalization has not been propitious for wage claims (in both regions), there has been 
nevertheless a noticeable increase of the profit share (and therefore of the mark-up) in Europe, 
whereas that share revealed more stable in Anglo-Saxon countries21. Furthermore, the 
appreciable acceleration of the United States productivity gains in the second half of the 
nineties resulted in a persistent difference between the annual rates of change (see figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Labour productivity index (2000=100), Total economy 
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 Another drawback of unconditional low inflation targeting may be enlightened in relation 
with the international monetary regime. The monetary unification of the Eurozone potentially 
reduces the scale of the policy mix coordination problem, since there is no more than one 
monetary authority left. But as the common interest rate influences the fiscal policies national 
outcomes, the policy mix efficiency closely depends on the ECB monetary policy. In order to 
discuss this point, let us extend the model of Table 1 so as to build a two-country monetary 
union model (see Table 3). 
 As the money market and the bonds market have been unified, the system comprises six 
markets (the two labour markets -immobile factor-, the two markets for goods - imperfect 
substitutes -, the market for bonds, and the market for money), which supposes five relative 
prices (the two real wages in terms of goods, the international relative price of goods, the rate 
of interest and the real price of money in terms of goods, which inverse is the average 
nominal price of goods). Because of the generalized budget constraint, the equilibrium 
condition for the market of bonds will remain implicit. 
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Table 3: ‘Shifting equilibrium’ in a monetary union (deviations from previous equilibrium) 
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Goods 
Markets 
(yi*,pi*) 
1111111 tˆynwp ξα +−−+=  


2222222 tˆynwp ξα +−−+=  

 
Money 
market 
(m*) 

( ) ( ) ippyym ˆ
2
1
2
1
2121 −+++= 

Bonds 
market 
 
Implicit 
 
Implicit 
(y1+y2)/2: is the relative variation in the average output of the Union 
(p1+p2)/2: is the relative variation in the average price index 
 
Adapting the monetary rule of the closed economy (equation 6 in Table 2), yields: 
 
( ) ( )2121 2
1
2
1
nnpp +−=+ β 

In this case, fiscal policies are likely to produce negative externalities, especially if they do 
not share the central bank objectives. Indeed, if an increase in gi aims at reducing the 
unemployment rate below the level the central bank considers the 'natural' level, the central 
bank raises the rate of interest so as to stabilize more or less the average level of prices in the 
union (according to the value of β), what implies a depressive effect in country j. Worse, if 
both countries implement such stimulating fiscal policies, they hinder each other through this 
negative transmission effect.  
 
 
 
 	
Conclusion 
 
For theories by definition yield imperfect representations of the real world, the thorough 
implementation of their policy recommendations may have pernicious effects. Our theoretic 
discussion of the effects of the 'New Consensus' monetary policy within nonergodic 
Keynesian systems puts forward three ‘mechanisms’ through which dogmatism may harm the 
effectiveness of monetary policy: the 'unemployment trap' effect, the 'fighting distributive 
conflict' effect and the 'conflicting fiscal policies' effect. Empirical observation at the same 
time suggests that the advantage of pragmatism may be magnified or tempered according to 
the general context. Indeed, the relative success of the Fed's policy in the Greenspan era was 
partly due, beyond –or possibly because of- the advantage of pragmatism, to the productivity 
gains differential (which tempered the income distribution conflict), and to the relatively easy 
coordination between the monetary and fiscal authorities (as compared with the Eurozone 
situation).  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix n°1 
We have introduced a fiscal effect on the supply side by supposing that in the short run it 
works through the price of the variable input: replacing the nominal cost of labour (W) by 
  
W(1+t), where 0<1 measures the (weakened) impact of the tax rate on the labour cost, 
profit maximisation requires Y/N=W(1+t)/P. The price index relative variation (p) drawn 
from this equation (see Table 1 in the text) takes the form of a function of the fiscally-
corrected labour cost, which relative variation is approximated by ( )tw ˆξ+  for small values 
of tˆ  ( tˆ  is the variation in t). 
 
Appendix n°2 
Starting from the aggregate demand function ( ) ( ) AGpitYY a ++−−− +1βυ , where Y 
represents the output volume, i the rate of interest, pa+1 the expected inflation rate till the next 
period, t the tax rate (taxes/output),  the propensity to consume, G the governments 
expenditure, A an autonomous component, the market for goods equilibrium requires: 
( ) ( ) AGpitYYY a ++−−−= +1βυ . 
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 (with d=0 and dpa+1=0), and dividing by 
Y0, we get: 
0000
0
00 Y
dA
Y
dGdi
Y
dt
Y
dY
t
Y
dY
Y
dY
++−−−=
β
υυυ  
Since t0=T0/Y0, the equality dG/Y0=t0dG/G holds when the budget is balanced (T0=G0). 
Writing relative deviation rates with small letters (x=dX/X0), except a=dA/Y0, we have: 
( ) agtdi
Y
dtyty ++−−−= 0
0
01
β
υυ  
hence: 
( ) tagiy ˆˆ γϕλσ −++−=  
where ( ) ( ) ( ) 00000 11
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Appendix n° 3 
It is not essential to make imperfect competition assumptions in order to obtain a mark-up 
relation. Indeed, starting from the production function Y=CN, <1, competitive pricing 
requires the marginal productivity to be equal to the real cost of labour: 
Y/N=W(1+t)/PP=W(1+t)/(CN-1)=(WN(1+t)/Y)/; hence, by differentiation of the 
associated logarithmic expression (for small values of tˆ ), we have p = w + n - y tˆξα +−  , 
where α  is the rate of variation in  (exogenous). Notice that an increasing mark-up on unit 
 
labour cost expresses in this case a declining wages-output ratio (α <0) and/or increasing 
fiscal taxes ( tˆ =dt>0). 
 
Appendix n°4 
The budget balance (B) is defined as: 
B=tPY-PG 
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 yields: 
dB=t0P0dY+P0Y0dt+t0Y0dP-P0dG-G0dP 
and dividing by the initial value of output: 
dB/(P0Y0)=t0dY/Y0+dt+t0dP/P0-dG/Y0-(G0/Y0)(dP/P0) 
Hence, around a situation of balanced budget where t0=G0/Y0 (remember g=dG/G0): 
b=t0(y-g)+dt 
and, with the same notation as in appendix n°2: 
( ) tgyb ˆ+−= ϕ  
 
Footnotes 
1
 According to Sardoni & Wray (2005) however, these factors do not explain correctly the 
difference in performances between the USA and the Eurozone; fiscal policies should also be 
taken into account. Fiscal policies are considered below (section 2.2). 
2
 See "What monetary policy can and cannot do" in The monetary policy of the ECB (ECB, 
2004, p. 41-42). 
3
 The ECB refers actually to an imprecise 'medium term'; see The monetary policy of the ECB 
(ECB, 2004, p. 55). 
4
 For a detailed argumentation see "the benefits of price stability" in The monetary policy of 
the ECB (ECB, 2004, p. 42-43). 
5
 See "The outcome of the ECB’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy", ECB monthly 
bulletin, Jun 2003, pp. 80-81. 
6
 "If one applies roughly the formula to the data of the Eurozone, we find two results: the 
refinancing rate the ECB used since 1999 should have been permanently right ahead lower 
that it has been, and even negative, but it should had known also a markedly more pronounced 
rise that it had known…" 
 
7
 In the mainstream literature on inflation targeting, the idea of monetary policy room for 
manœuvre refers to the 'constrained discretion' pointed out by Bernanke & Mishkin (1997, p 
106). It is based upon the theory of dynamic inconsistency of discretionary policies, which 
recommends limiting the discretionary power. 
8
 Various authors have pointed out the discretionary nature of Greenspan's monetary policy. 
"The low inflation and economic stability of the 1990s shows that discretionary monetary 
policy can work well. Yet it leaves only a limited legacy for future policymakers. U.S. 
monetary policymakers during the 1990s may well have been engaged in 'covert inflation 
targeting' at a rate of about 3 percent, but they never made that policy explicit." Mankiw, 
2001, pp. 52-53. James K. Galbraith's interpretation is still more clear-cut : "This brief review 
of Federal Reserve policy reveals an institution with a stricking doctrinal flexibility. […] In so 
doing, it has devalued the contribution of theoretical and ideological economists to the point 
where, at the most, their role is to provide window dressing for decisions taken largely –if not 
entirely- for other reasons. Doctrine in American monetary policy has become endogenous to 
the policies that it serves." Galbraith (2006), pp. 431-32. 
9
 The mainstream literature recognizes the role of credibility as a precondition of inflation 
control only. By contrast, in the Keynesian approach (see section 2 below), credibility also 
affects real magnitudes through the decisive influence on the 'state of confidence'. Le Heron 
(2006, 2007) argues that confidence was a crucial aspect of Greenspan's strategy. 
10
 Actually, the view according to which economic processes are stationary is more and more 
denied on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Farmer 2002 and Henri 2002). The 
flourishing literature on regime-switching (Hinich, Foster & Wild 2006, Evans & Ramey 
2006), non rational expectations and adaptive learning (Sargent 1999; Preston, 2006), rational 
beliefs (Kurz 1994, Kurz & Motolese 2001, Wu & Guo, 2003)… show how enlarging is the 
notion of uncertainty in contemporaneous macroeconomics.  
11
 See The General Theory, Ch. 21, Section I, third paragraph. 
12
 Otherwise, wages would decrease continuously because of unemployment pressure. See 
Tobin (1975) and Palley (2005) about this kind of instability. 
13
 According to the generalized budget constraint, it is not possible for only n-1 markets of n 
to be simultaneously cleared. That does not mean, contrary to the mainstream's interpretation 
in terms of Walras Law, that unemployment is a matter of disequilibrium. As Davidson (1994, 
p. 178) pointed out, market clearing is a sufficient condition for market equilibrium; it is not a 
 
necessary condition. Markets may be in equilibrium without being cleared, as far as no forces 
move it. 
14
 Actually, it is important to bear in mind that most equations of Keynesian models do not 
pretend to the stability that is usually assumed in the mainstream models. 
15
 See Arestis & Sawyer (2003), Arestis (2006) and Arestis & Chortareas (2007) on this 
topic. 
16 For example, the first order condition that g must verify in order to minimize: 
L=(1/2)(n²+b²) is n(n/g)+b(b/g)=0 
which is equivalent to b=n provided that =-(n/g)/(b/g). This approach sometimes 
raises difficulties that will not be discussed here. 
17
 See Dixit & Lambertini (2003). 
18
 On hysteresis, ergodic and non-ergodic regimes, see the Minisymposium in the Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, 15(3), Spring 1993. 
19
 In an open economy, the prices of oil and imported intermediate goods should also be 
taken into account. 
20
 See Palley (1997, 2001) for an empirical discussion. 
21
 See Lequiller & Sylvain (2006) for a recent assessment. 
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